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US citizen charged after GrapheneOS phone wipes during airport search

by eecc on 7/26/2026, 10:21:41 PM

https://www.techspot.com/news/113236-us-prosecutors-charge-atlanta-man-after-grapheneos-phone.html

Comments

by: cameldrv

I’ve seen a lot of people on the internet over the years say things like “the government can’t make x illegal, it’s just y.” For example, the government can’t make wiping your phone at the border illegal, it’s just punching four numbers into your phone, just like a pin, only a different four numbers, which could just have well been your pin.<p>U.S. law though is highly non-autistic and what you were trying to do is just as important as what you superficially did. Hell there could have been a third set of four numbers that were the nuclear launch codes. It’s not the fact that it was four numbers, it’s what you were trying to make happen when you typed them. Now of course whether they can prove what your intent was when you typed them is another matter, but generally a duress pin should be for when robbers are breaking into your house, and the government will be on your side, and not when the government will be against you.

7/27/2026, 1:39:17 AM


by: sfRattan

Ultimately, when you choose to enter a duress PIN that will wipe your device, you have to recognize that choice may have legal consequences. I don&#x27;t like the amount of power our government has at the national border when it comes to detaining and pressuring citizens, but our Constitution explicitly grants it at least some of the power it now exercises in that context.<p>If your threat model includes US state actors at the national border, then your security practices need to account for the confiscation of your device at that border without requiring you to willfully wipe the phone and (in the eyes of police and prosecutors) destroy evidence.<p>That means:<p>1. <i>Don&#x27;t travel with anything you can&#x27;t afford to lose on device</i>. This means setting up travel-specific password managers and hardware keys for a subset of your accounts that you absolutely need to access while abroad, and being prepared to reset those passwords and disable those hardware keys very quickly once home.<p>2. Review past legal cases against travelers and identify what behaviors the government considers worthy of prosecution or harassment. <i>Your secure setup must function without needing you to engage in those behaviors</i>, even if it is less convenient as a result. This isn&#x27;t perfect, as the government may decide some new behavior is prosecutable.<p>3. <i>Consult with a lawyer and review your security procedures from a legal standpoint</i>. All of the above is technical and practical advice, not legal counsel and no substitute for it.<p>We Americans are fortunate to carry powerful passports and enjoy relatively easy international travel but, for better or worse, that velvet glove covers an iron fist we would be foolish to forget or ignore.

7/27/2026, 12:56:46 AM


by: jameson

&gt; During the questioning, agents repeatedly asked Tunick to unlock his phone and warned they would seize it if he refused. When he finally provided a passcode, the phone appeared to restart.<p>I&#x27;m confused to understand if Tunick did anything illegal here. If the authorities want the phone, they should have the warrant and seize it without Tunick&#x27;s permission.<p>It appears authorities did not have the warrant which give Tunick all the right to do whatever he desires with his property.<p>What am I missing here?

7/27/2026, 2:07:23 AM


by: DanHulton

If your threat model means you can’t afford for border security to view your device, wipe the damn thing yourself before crossing the border and restore it from an encrypted online backup on the other side.<p>You’re just carrying a blank phone that you intend to set up and use later, and they can’t force you to install your backup onto a phone.<p>Now, this is sus as hell, and you’ll probably draw all kinds of extra attention, but if border security wants access to your phone in the first place, you’re already in a weird place.

7/27/2026, 1:34:30 AM


by: Grimblewald

VeraCrypt has a cool function which is a reserved space for a decoy OS.[1] Everything else registers as free space while decrypting to dummy volume. You make the dummy volume look lived in, and forget. provide dummy password, volume decrypts such that only dummy is accessible&#x2F;readable. give proper password, real OS and FS decrypt and load.<p>Something like this may need to become the standars over duress pins which should be treated as a fallback or more extreme alternative. Right now, A single choice to reasonably and rightfully protect your privacy reuslts in jail time over something which likely wouldnt have resulted in any issues if superficial compliance was observed.<p>These goons, even if a branch of a facist regime, are ultimately burocrats with violent options to settle. They aren&#x27;t doing forensics on your device etc. They have neither means nor knowledge to do so. They just need to tick their boxes. Did the phone unlock? tick. Did our spyware complain? no? tick. Overall appearance of compliance from person? yes? tick. free to go, next!<p>You just have to find ways to stay safe without agitating their workflow and all is well.<p>- [1] <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;veracrypt.io&#x2F;en&#x2F;VeraCrypt%20Hidden%20Operating%20System.html" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;veracrypt.io&#x2F;en&#x2F;VeraCrypt%20Hidden%20Operating%20Sys...</a>

7/26/2026, 11:37:16 PM


by: incompatible

One of the GrapheneOS people (I think) suggested keeping a bit of paper in your wallet with the duress pin, perhaps thinly disguised. Then the cops could try it on their own initiative. I suppose they&#x27;d become aware of that trick eventually, but then they wouldn&#x27;t be able to use all those other genuine pins they find.

7/27/2026, 1:07:18 AM


by: Guvante

How are they going to prove there was evidence of a crime? While destruction of potential evidence does introduce a certain amount of leeway that doesn&#x27;t allow going from absolutely nothing to &quot;evidence was on the wiped device&quot;.<p>Most previous court cases involving encrypted devices have required substantial proof that the encrypted device contained incriminating evidence. To be clear &quot;you sent this illegal thing from your house&quot; levels of evidence.<p>It mostly seems inept, if you are going to push to expand your powers you do it on strong cases where you know what happened. Doing it on weak cases like this gives a judge an opportunity to shut down that without giving you a chance of a meaningful conviction and without that you won&#x27;t get any benefits...

7/27/2026, 12:19:57 AM


by: daishi55

&gt; federal agents had already circulated his name and photo internally, saying he was under investigation for &quot;suspected terrorism activities&quot; because of his alleged association with the movement against Cop City<p>Of course it’s about that huh. It’s quite scary how far the US will go against anyone who engages in this sort of activism.

7/27/2026, 1:58:37 AM


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7/27/2026, 1:05:21 AM


by: ApolloFortyNine

The article seems to be muddying the water bringing up grapheneOS itself. Or maybe it&#x27;s the EFF.<p>&gt;Experts said the legal approach is unusual and may be the first time the law has been aimed at an operating system. &quot;It&#x27;s concerning – and sends the message that [GrapheneOS] is criminal by default,&quot; said Christophe Boutry, a cybersecurity and surveillance expert. Boutry and Bill Buddington, senior staff technologist at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, both said they had not seen a similar case.<p>Is the actual case about banning the OS? Because it seems pretty clear the case is about the result (the phone being wiped with a special passcode).<p>The better defense imo would be one of those &#x27;wipe the phone if you get the password wrong x times&#x27; and try and claim you forgot under pressure. At least if you wanted to wipe the phone without being accused of destroying evidence during a search.

7/27/2026, 1:36:54 AM


by: teravor

maybe write down the duress pin somewhere in your wallet. let them make their own assumptions and erase the alleged evidence on their own.

7/27/2026, 12:41:53 AM


by: anduril22

As a citizen the safest way is to just refuse. They can’t refuse entry. Not the same for LPRs.

7/27/2026, 1:13:19 AM


by: siilats

Having just gone through having to give pin to cbp you just need the apps on your phones to have separate pins so when police unlocks it, they cannot unlock WhatsApp afterwards. Faceid or unique pin. Problem is your phone pin overwrites Face ID

7/27/2026, 1:27:05 AM


by: calvinmorrison

Related, There was a local guy who was held &#x27;in contempt&#x27; for 4 years for refusing to turn over his password&#x2F;encryption key<p><a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;arstechnica.com&#x2F;tech-policy&#x2F;2020&#x2F;02&#x2F;man-who-refused-to-decrypt-hard-drives-is-free-after-four-years-in-jail&#x2F;" rel="nofollow">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;arstechnica.com&#x2F;tech-policy&#x2F;2020&#x2F;02&#x2F;man-who-refused-...</a>

7/27/2026, 2:03:10 AM


by: iamleppert

Instead of a PIN that wipes the device, it would be much better to setup a special PIN that logs the user into a sanitized, completely separate profile with generated content of no practical value. This would create plausible deniability, and be sufficient to allow low-level border agents to look through a phone and pass any checks without raising these kinds of alarms. The wipe PIN should still be an option, but should be separate, and only be for cases where you suspect a forensic imaging or search of the device is to take place and the legal consequences outweigh the risks.

7/27/2026, 1:55:41 AM


by: comrade1234

So let them just sieze your device. Don&#x27;t unlock. You&#x27;ll get it back in a few months.

7/27/2026, 12:37:54 AM


by: MikeNotThePope

There needs to be a simple feature to wipe your phone and then restore to a point and time. That’d be really convenient.

7/27/2026, 1:11:55 AM


by: deadbabe

I don’t understand why phones can’t just have decoy profiles you can activate via PIN that look like regular harmless user profiles? Especially now with AI you can quickly populate with a bunch of plausible data.<p>Or better, have PIN for taking you to your criminal&#x2F;secret profile instead.

7/27/2026, 1:54:48 AM


by: amanaplanacanal

If they were searching for evidence of a crime, what crime was it?

7/27/2026, 12:13:08 AM


by: ChrisArchitect

[dupe] Discussion: <a href="https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=49024436">https:&#x2F;&#x2F;news.ycombinator.com&#x2F;item?id=49024436</a>

7/27/2026, 1:00:08 AM


by: zuzululu

why not just have a separate device for traveling ?

7/27/2026, 1:52:09 AM


by: crypttales

[dead]

7/27/2026, 1:12:13 AM


by: flerchin

I just wouldn&#x27;t want my dick pics to get out.

7/27/2026, 12:53:32 AM


by: drweevil

While I like the idea behind GrapheneOS, I&#x27;d rather not place myself in jeopardy of some ridiculous charge like this one. I prefer to travel with a travel device, some inexpensive phone and&#x2F;or laptop that contains nothing interesting. If they then wish to take it from me because I won&#x27;t unlock it, then have at it! That said, the situation with respect to our Bill of Rights at the border has gotten ridiculous.

7/27/2026, 1:04:57 AM